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IT TAKES A VILLAGE: REPURPOSING
TAKINGS DOCTRINE TO ADDRESS
MELTING PERMAFROST IN ALASKA
NATIVE TOWNS
Sasha Kahn*
ABSTRACT
Dozens of Alaska Native villages face an existential crisis as Alaska’s
permafrost melts, causing soil erosion and instability. Adapting to these
rapidly changing conditions is unworkable, so most villages will have to
physically move to locations atop bedrock. The estimated costs for these moves
are enormous, and not even the combination of available federal and state
administrative resources can adequately cover them. One possible avenue for
funding is a state inverse condemnation regulatory takings claim, which posits
that state action has caused the property destruction in the villages. Alaska has
a unique relationship to its oil extraction industry, which has demonstrably
contributed to global climate change, the main cause of the permafrost melt. To
facilitate a potential takings claim, this Note presents two possible avenues for
argument: a “direct approach” that focuses only on state oil leases as
government action and a “hybrid approach” that instead considers the leases
as part of a more holistic investment by the state in its oil. This Note also
considers the shortcomings of the overall takings strategy, along with the
potential for its use in response to other cases of environmentally related
property destruction.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution states that
“private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”1 At the beginning of the twentieth century, this doctrine
was further expanded to encompass regulatory takings.2 This means that,
even when no physical invasion has occurred, government activity,
typically in the form of regulation, may become so burdensome that it
effectively deprives certain landowners of the use of their land.3 In recent
jurisprudence, regulatory takings doctrine has been placed in direct
conflict with environmental protection and the broader movement to
fight the effects of climate change.4
But with ecological collapse and global system disruption becoming
more present and obvious by the minute, actions taken by both the U.S.
government and individual states present an opportunity to link these
problems to their source. While part of the legal community continues
searching for ways to preempt impending climate catastrophe, regulatory
takings doctrine may present a possible avenue for relief where
environmental destruction is imminent or already occurring.
This Note begins in Part II with a discussion of how permafrost melt
is making some Alaska Native villages in northern and western Alaska
unlivable. Town relocation is the only viable option for most of these
villages, but the administrative resources that exist to support
infrastructure development and redevelopment are inadequate.5 Seeking
a legal alternative, this Note sets out one possible way to utilize takings
doctrine to respond to the property destruction wrought by permafrost
melt. Specifically, this Note walks through the steps required to make an
inverse condemnation takings claim against the State of Alaska. As
discussed in Part III, inverse condemnation is a term used to describe the
restitution that plaintiffs may seek after state action has taken property
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. See Kirsten Engle, Taking Risks: Executive Order 12,630 and Environmental
Health and Safety Regulation, 14 VT. L. REV. 213, 241 (1989) (“Prior to Mahon, the
Court adhered to the view that regulatory measures designed to prevent a
noxious use could not effect a taking.”).
3. See Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (“[W]hile property may
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as
a taking.”).
4. See Mark Nevitt, As We Adapt to Climate Change, Legal Doctrine Must Also
Adapt, THE WHARTON SCH. RISK MGMT. & DECISION PROCESSES CTR.,
https://riskcenter.wharton.upenn.edu/climate-risk-solutions-2/legal-doctrinemust-also-adapt/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2021) (“[F]ederal, state, and local climate
adaptation measures must be careful to not run afoul of the Regulatory Takings
doctrine.”).
5. See infra Part II.
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from them for public use, while diminishing the property’s value in the
process.6 Part III also describes how several different takings analyses
have developed since the ratification of the U.S. Constitution, but due to
Alaska’s narrow interpretation of per se takings, plaintiffs will likely need
to demonstrate that the inverse condemnation satisfies the ad hoc test
developed in Anchorage v. Sandberg.7
Next, Part IV describes how, because Alaska both directly and
indirectly invested so heavily in its oil extraction industry, a potential
plaintiff may argue that this decades-long venture constitutes state action.
Then, Part V delves into the establishment of causation. To build the
causal chain, science-backed data show that oil extracted from Alaska and
burned within and outside of the state has been a tangible contributor to
the greenhouse effect and the resulting rise in global temperatures,
causing permafrost melt, and culminating in the eventual destruction of
Alaska Native villages.
Further, Parts VI and VII lay out how Alaska’s proximate cause
standard for inverse condemnation has loosened in recent decades, but
how the steps in the causal chain and the required reliance on
approximated contributions to climate change, combined with American
courts’ aversion to directly addressing climate change issues, present a
formidable barrier to success. Part VII also addresses the reality that
takings law only permits restitution for private property destruction and
will not account for destroyed roads, airports, or schools, meaning that
this strategy cannot singlehandedly address the financing challenges
Alaska Native villages face.
To conclude, Part VIII recognizes that, today, this argument is
unlikely to succeed in Alaska’s courts. However, with incremental gains
for individuals and organizations filing suit in state and federal courts for
government-sponsored climate destruction, this avenue may open up in
Alaska in the not-too-distant future. Moreover, this strategy has the
potential to translate to other legal actions addressing environmental
issues throughout the country.

6. See Beeson v. City of Palmer, 370 P.3d 1084, 1088 (Alaska 2016) (“A party
alleging inverse condemnation must establish the following elements: (1) a taking
or damaging of private property (2) proximately caused by a government entity
(3) exercising power in the public interest without formal condemnation
proceedings.”).
7. 861 P.2d 554, 557 (Alaska 1993).
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II. PERMAFROST MELT AND ITS EFFECTS ON ALASKA NATIVE
VILLAGES
Alaska’s geographical and hydrological conditions are relatively
unique in the United States but are consistent with those throughout
communities in the northern and southern land extremities of the globe.8
Significant portions of the state sit on permafrost, defined as ground that
has remained below thirty-two degrees Fahrenheit for two years or more.9
In total, nearly five million people around the world live upon
permafrost, a small but notable minority of whom live in Alaska.10 It is
estimated that eighty percent of Alaska’s land has permafrost beneath it.11
Much of the permafrost in Alaska has been frozen for thousands of years
and can be hundreds of feet thick.12 The permanent frozen conditions can
create a virtual bedrock of solid ground on which people can build
settlements.13 However, there are numerous challenges posed by these
buildings, especially with heating, which may cause near-surface ice to
melt.14 These issues are not new, as Alaska Native groups have had
thousands of years of experience developing strategies to live on the
permanently frozen ground.15
Global climate change, associated with rising global air and water
temperatures, is causing unprecedented permafrost melt that only
promises to worsen.16 This melting reduces the ice composition of the
ground, causing the soil to lose its active top layer and creating
embankment erosion.17 The soil itself grows unstable and roads and
8. All About Frozen Ground: Where Is It?, NAT’L SNOW & ICE DATA CTR.,
https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/frozenground/whereis_fg.html (last visited Jan.
18, 2022) (citing Alaska as one of the only states containing permafrost, but among
several global regions).
9. Id.
10. Justine Ramage et al., Population Living on Permafrost in the Arctic, 43
POPULATION & ENV’T 22, 27 (2021).
11. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, ADAPTING TO CLIMATE CHANGE ALASKA, at 2 (2016),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/default/files/201607/documents/alaska_fact_sheet.pdf.
12. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., ARCTIC CHANGE: LAND –
PERMAFROST, https://www.pmel.noaa.gov/arctic-zone/detect/landpermafrost.shtml.
13. All About Frozen Ground: People and Frozen Ground, NAT’L SNOW & ICE
DATA CTR., https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/frozenground/people.html (last
visited Dec. 15, 2021).
14. Id.
15. All About Arctic Climatology and Meteorology: Arctic People, NAT’L SNOW &
ICE DATA CTR., https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/arctic-meteorology/arcticpeople.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).
16. ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11; see also discussion infra Section (V)(A).
17. Blake Gentry, Native Peoples and Permafrost in Alaska, THE HIGHER GROUND
FOUND. (last updated Apr. 9, 2020),
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buildings begin to crack or even collapse without structural support.18 For
whole communities built atop permafrost, liquification of the ice can be
disastrous.19 The effects go far beyond the integrity of building
foundations, threatening water quality, river and stream discharge, and
habitats for fish and wildlife.20
The erosion caused by permafrost melt alone presents significant
danger to Alaska Native villages, but arctic sea melt, another direct result
of rising global temperatures, further exacerbates this danger.21 Larger
storm surges, driven by climate change, accelerate erosion where
permafrost has melted.22 These factors put villages on the coast at even
greater risk of severe damage.
Organizations like the Cold Climate Housing Research Center in
Fairbanks, Alaska, have recommended avoiding building on permafrost
and offered suggestions and solutions for pre-construction planning for
those planning to build on it anyway.23 These include constructing
adjustable foundation piers, ventilated crawlspaces, and refrigerated
supports.24 However, for those already upon the permafrost, few realistic
options exist. Publicly available instructions for retrofitting individual

https://www.thehighergroundfoundation.org/post/ii-native-peoples-andpermafrost-in-alaska.
18. See, e.g., Svetlana Skarbo, Building Breaks in Middle and Collapses 10 Metres
as Thawing Permafrost No Longer Supports Stilts, THE SIBERIAN TIMES (Apr. 6, 2021),
https://siberiantimes.com/other/others/news/building-breaks-in-middle-andcollapses-10-metres-as-thawing-permafrost-no-longer-supportsstilts/?comm_order=best; Chris Baraniuk, The Fragile Future of Roads and Buildings
Built on Permafrost, BRIT. BROAD. CO. (Mar. 4, 2021),
https://www.bbc.com/future/article/20210303-the-unsure-future-of-roadsand-buildings-on-melting-ground.
19. See Ramage et al., supra note 10, at 23 (“The changing environmental
conditions not only affect people by damaging infrastructure but also impact the
livelihoods and cultural activities of the populations living on permafrost.”).
20. Carl Markon et al., Alaska, in IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE
UNITED STATES: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT, VOLUME II, 1185, 1188
(2018),
https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_Ch26_Alaska_Full.pdf.
21. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., ARCTIC REPORT CARD 2020,
https://arctic.noaa.gov/Portals/7/ArcticReportCard/Documents/ArcticReport
Card_full_report2020.pdf?ver=2020-12-08-151255-807.
22. Susan Nerberg, Meltdown – The Permafrost That Holds the Arctic Together Is
Falling Apart, THE ARCTIC INST. (Mar. 2, 2021),
https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/meltdown-permafrost-arctic-togetherfalling-apart/.
23. See ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, supra note 11, at 2 (“The Cold Climate Housing
Research Center . . . advised businesses and residents to avoid building on
permafrost [and] designs homes with adjustable foundation piers, which can be
adjusted if permafrost conditions deteriorate.”).
24. Permafrost Foundations, COLD CLIMATE HOUS. RSCH. CTR.,
http://cchrc.org/permafrost-foundations-2/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2021).
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buildings built on melting permafrost have not been updated since 2001,
and those instructions describe a long and expensive process of
investigative drilling followed by installation of either large amounts of
insulation or complicated systems to keep the ground frozen.25
Retrofitting is therefore challenging for single buildings and completely
unrealistic for entire villages.
The combination of storm surge and melting permafrost threatens to
decimate coastal towns like Newtok (Niugtaq in Central Yup’ik
language), Alaska, a village of Qaluyaarmiut, the “dip net people,” who
follow a subsistence way of life.26 The Qaluyaarmiut have lived on or near
this site for roughly two thousand years.27 From 1983 to 2013, the eroding
shoreline lost between nineteen and eighty-eight feet per year, putting
some houses within a hundred feet of the frigid Ninglick River.28
After considering every conceivable option, Newtok began a
program in the 1990s to move the town.29 This required lobbying
Congress to approve a transfer from the U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service for
land that sits atop bedrock nine miles away; hiring a consulting firm; and
constructing a new marina, a new school, and, of course, new houses at
the site.30 On October 15, 2019, after three decades of planning, one-third
of the village moved to the new site, Mertavik, making it the first Alaska
Native village to officially relocate due to melting permafrost and climate
change.31 However, despite all of the time and effort put into making the
transition, two months after the move, there was no running water in the
new school, the interiors of the homes were left unfinished, the power
plant was incomplete, and the construction of the health clinic was

25. See Design Manual for Stabilizing Foundations on Permafrost, COLD CLIMATE
HOUS. RSCH. CTR. (2001),
http://cchrc.org/media/DesignManualforStabilizingFoundationsonPermafrost.
pdf.
26. The Village – Newtok, RELOCATE NEWTOK,
https://relocatenewtok.org/about/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2021).
27. Id.
28. See id. (“One longtime resident remarked that as a child she couldn’t see
water from her house at the edge of the village, not even if she squinted. Now, the
river water laps menacingly just 80 feet from her back porch. Her home will be
one of the first to go.”).
29. Newtok Planning Group, Newtok Village Relocation History: Part Two: Early
Efforts to Address Erosion, ALASKA DEPT. OF COM., CMTY., & ECON. DEV.,
https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/dcra/PlanningLandManagement/Ne
wtokPlanningGroup/NewtokVillageRelocationHistory/NewtokHistoryPartTw
o.aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 2022) [hereinafter Newtok Relocation History].
30. Newtok’s Land Exchange and Relocation, UNIV. OF ALASKA FAIRBANKS: ADAPT
ALASKA, https://adaptalaska.org/case-study/newtoks-land-exchange-andrelocation/ (last visited Mar. 5, 2022); Gentry, supra note 17.
31. Gentry, supra note 17.
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ongoing.32 The Newtok relocation plan demonstrates how such relocation
is possible, but it also shows the major costs and risks. The initial stages
of evaluation began in 1983 and it took thirty-six years from these first
assessments of potential damages to move only one-third of the town.33
That amount of time allowed Newtok to receive funding from the Alaska
legislature for the initial assessment, as well as from the Bureau of Indian
Affairs and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) for the planning
and construction itself.34 Part of the relocation’s success was also the result
of political pressure from Alaska’s congressional delegation, which
supported and passed federal legislation approving the acquisition of the
Mertavik land.35 However, as U.S. Senator Lisa Murkowski (R-AK) put it,
even with Newtok partially relocated, the problem is that “there’s 30 more
villages.”36
In 2003, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) found
that 184 of the 213 Alaska Native villages in the state were facing some
flooding and erosion.37 In 2009, the GAO issued an update, identifying
thirty-one Alaska Native villages, mostly in the western part of the state,
facing imminent threats from accelerating permafrost melt.38 The 2003
report discussed possible state and federal solutions to the problem,
including expanding the Denali Commission,39 having the Corps and the
Natural Resources Conservation Service (NRCS) alter their cost-benefit
analyses to include social and environmental factors, waiving the federal
cost-share requirement for flooding and erosion projects, and authorizing

32. Id.
33. See Newtok Relocation History, supra note 29 (stating consultants were first
hired in 1983); Gentry, supra note 17 (“The group . . . who moved . . . on October
15, 2019 did not have running water nor sewer for the new school . . . .”).
34. Newtok Relocation History, supra note 29.
35. Gentry, supra note 17.
36. Geof Koss, ‘We Cannot Wait.’ Sinking Alaska Village Finds New Home, E&E
NEWS (Sept. 4, 2019), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1061110713.
37. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-04-142, ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES:
MOST ARE AFFECTED BY FLOODING AND EROSION, BUT FEW QUALIFY FOR FEDERAL
ASSISTANCE, at 1 (2003), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-04-142.pdf
[hereinafter GAO 2003 REPORT] (agency formerly known as General Accounting
Office).
38. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-551, ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES:
LIMITED PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE ON RELOCATING VILLAGES THREATENED BY
FLOODING AND EROSION, at 1 (2009), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-09-551.pdf
[hereinafter GAO 2009 UPDATE].
39. “Introduced by Congress in 1998, the Denali Commission is an
independent federal agency designed to provide critical utilities, infrastructure,
and economic support throughout Alaska. With the creation of the Denali
Commission, Congress acknowledged the need for increased inter-agency
cooperation and focus on Alaska’s remote communities.” Denali Commission Story,
DENALI COMM’N, https://www.denali.gov/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2022).
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agency fund-bundling.40
The 2009 update found that twelve of the thirty-one villages facing
the largest threat were considering relocation options, but the update
noted that none of the proposed policies to help support and fund the
transitions had been implemented.41 For four villages in particular,
including Newtok, the GAO estimated that there were ten to fifteen years
left before their locations were “lost to erosion.”42 The estimated economic
cost for relocation at these four locations was $80 to $200 million, which
included new evacuation roads, airports, and housing.43 This did not take
into account the cultural loss suffered by communities forced to leave
places they had inhabited for hundreds or even thousands of years.44
Although Newtok acquired funding for its ongoing relocation, its
successes, however limited, have not been universal. Other threatened
villages seeking assistance from federal and state programs have been
unable to attain adequate funding.45 This is partially by design. For
example, agency programs—like the Corps’s Continuing Authorities
Program, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Hazard
Mitigation Grant Program and Pre-Disaster Mitigation Program, and
NRCS’s Emergency Watershed Protection program—each require costsharing, meaning that villages must procure millions of dollars from
alternative sources to fund their relocation.46 All three agency programs
likewise require detailed cost-benefit analyses, and the Corps gives
priority to those that have the highest benefit-to-cost ratio.47
While federal agencies do not currently coordinate on action
planning and funding, Alaska designated the Department of Commerce,
Community, and Economic Development as the lead state agency for
village relocation assistance along with the Immediate Action
Workgroup, part of the Governor’s Sub-Cabinet on Climate Change.48
The state also developed the Alaska Climate Change Impact Mitigation
Program, which awarded grants of up to $150,000 for relocation
planning.49 However, the grant program was not re-funded after its first

40. GAO 2003 REPORT, supra note 37, at 41–48.
41. GAO 2009 UPDATE, supra note 38, at 16, 27–34.
42. Id. at 10.
43. Id.
44. See generally id. (making no mention of cultural cost associated with
relocation); GAO 2003 REPORT, supra note 37 (also making no mention of cultural
cost associated with relocation).
45. GAO 2003 REPORT, supra note 37.
46. GAO 2009 UPDATE, supra note 38, at 20–27.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 40.
49. Id. at 34.
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year.50 Instead, risk assessment is now done directly through the Alaska
Risk Mapping, Assessment and Planning Program, which connects local
governments to FEMA and the state government.51 These assessments
often include discussion of migration and relocation but do not mention
how villages and individuals might afford those transitions.52
For villages that cannot afford to participate in cost-sharing with
federal agencies, the prospects of funding hundred-million-dollar
relocations are bleak. Even in Newtok, where decades of planning and
sustained political pressure led to moderate financing success, two-thirds
of the village has still not moved and is currently facing sinking telephone
poles, cracking boardwalks, the disappearance of their natural sewage
removal waterway, and the blossoming of dangerous mold.53
With wildly inadequate administrative solutions, other
considerations must be made. Where policy has failed, the doctrine of
regulatory takings presents an alternative opportunity for remedy.

III. A REVIEW OF REGULATORY TAKINGS LAW
Regulatory takings law is widely considered to have been borne of
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon.54 Justice Holmes recognized that the “[g]overnment could hardly
go on” if it had to compensate property owners for every exercise of the
police power that reduced “to some extent the values incident to
property.”55 Nonetheless, the opinion expressed that there are limits to
such police power, concluding that “while property may be regulated to
a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.”56
While not explicitly under the title of “regulatory takings”
established in Pennsylvania Coal, U.S. courts have effectively recognized a
broader application of regulatory takings doctrine to other, nonregulatory government action detrimental to individual property. In the
50. Telephone Interview with Sally Russell Cox, Alaska Dept. of Com., Cmty.,
& Econ. Dev., Div. of Cmty. and Reg’l Affs. (Oct. 27, 2021).
51. Alaska Risk MAP Program, ALASKA DEPT. OF COM., CMTY., & ECON. DEV.,
https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/dcra/PlanningLandManagement/Ris
kMAP.aspx (last visited Oct. 27, 2021).
52. See, e.g., ALASKA DEPT. OF COM., CMTY., & ECON. DEV., WORKING GROUP ON
ADAPTATION, ASSISTING IMMINENTLY-THREATENED ALASKA NATIVE VILLAGES (2018),
https://www.commerce.alaska.gov/web/Portals/4/pub/RiskMAP/CALT_Pre
sentation_SRCox.pdf (describing planning for adaptation and mitigation with no
mention of cost).
53. Gentry, supra note 17.
54. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
55. Id. at 413.
56. Id. at 415.
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1860s, after a Wisconsin government project to dam the Fox River flooded
the surrounding area, farmers whose land was destroyed went to court
seeking compensation from the state.57 The U.S. Supreme Court found in
Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co. that a government taking
had occurred, stating: “[W]here real estate is actually invaded by
superinduced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or by
having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectually destroy or
impair its usefulness, it is a taking, within the meaning of the Constitution
. . . .”58
Since Pennsylvania Coal, courts have consistently held that
government actions that were not explicitly regulatory, but nonetheless
caused a significant diminution in the value of a plaintiff’s property,
amount to takings. In United States v. Causby,59 the U.S. military conducted
frequent flights out of an airport in Greensboro, North Carolina.60 The
plaintiffs in the case owned a nearby chicken farm, but the military planes
flew so low and were so loud that the farm owners were often unable to
sleep.61 Furthermore, about 150 of their chickens died flying into the walls
in fright, and the plaintiffs eventually had to shutter their business.62 In
his majority opinion finding for the farm owners, Justice Douglas stated
“a direct and immediate interference with the enjoyment and use of the
land” rendering that land uninhabitable is a constitutional taking.63
Present-day regulatory takings law has provided new context for
decisions like Pumpelly and Causby. U.S. courts typically evaluate
regulatory takings questions using the ad hoc balancing test set out in
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.64 Commenting on the
relationship between regulatory takings and physical invasion, the Penn
Central Court noted that “[a] ‘taking’ may more readily be found when
the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion
by government . . . than when interference arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote
the common good.”65 The case arose when the city of New York enforced
an architectural heritage law that blocked plaintiffs from constructing an
office building on top of Grand Central Station.66 At issue was whether
this regulatory action amounted to a taking of the superjacent airspace
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co., 80 U.S. 166 (1871).
Id. at 181.
328 U.S. 256 (1946).
Id. at 258–59.
Id. at 259.
Id.
Id. at 264, 266.
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
Id. (citing Causby, 328 U.S. at 256).
Id. at 116–18.
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above the train station.67 In affirming that no taking had occurred, the
Court set up a tripartite test evaluating the (1) overall economic impact;
(2) parties’ protection from interference of their “distinct” investmentbacked expectations; and (3) character of the government action.68
In 1992, the U.S. Supreme Court introduced a more stringent
standard for regulatory takings in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.69
The issue was whether coastal management regulations promulgated by
South Carolina, in preventing a property developer from building houses
atop his land, were regulatory takings.70 Writing for the Court, Justice
Scalia stated that “[w]here the State seeks to sustain regulation that
deprives land of all economically beneficial use, we think it may resist
compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of
the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part
of his title to begin with.”71 Effectively, when government action deprives
a property owner of all economic use of her land, this is a categorical, or
per se, taking.72
Alaska’s takings doctrine has grown from these federal roots. The
Alaska Constitution states: “[p]rivate property shall not be taken or
damaged for public use without just compensation.”73 Alaska’s courts
assert that this “provides greater protection for property owners than

67. Id. at 118–19.
68. Id. at 124.
69. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
70. Id. at 1006–07, 1015.
71. Id. at 1027.
72. See id. at 1015–16. But see id. at 1066–67 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing
how the majority opinion’s rationale “do[es] not justify a per se rule for total
regulatory takings”). In the years since and as a direct result of the Lucas decision,
environmental protection has become significantly more difficult. See Nevitt,
supra note 4 (“[F]ederal, state, and local climate adaptation measures must be
careful to not run afoul of the Regulatory Takings doctrine.”). States and
municipalities have struggled to come up with solutions for land protection, and
some have said they effectively cannot deny building permits outright, even in
coastal areas with high likelihoods of erosion. Amanda Reilly, How a 1992 High
Court Ruling Eroded Regulatory Might, E&E NEWS (June 30, 2017, 1:15 PM),
https://subscriber.politicopro.com/article/eenews/1060056890. One exception
was the Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002) decision, where a temporary moratorium on development imposed for the
purpose of developing a comprehensive land-use plan was found not to constitute
a per se taking because it was temporary. Id. at 340–41. However, this regulation
was for the purpose of environmental assessment, not substantive regulation. See
id. at 310–11 (discussing the passage of the temporary moratorium for the
purposes of evaluating water and air quality, among other environmental
considerations). Based on this model, with certain conditions met, Alaska presents
a new frontier for regulatory takings jurisprudence, using Lucas to combat, rather
than uphold, environmental degradation and destruction.
73. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 18.
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does the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.”74 While
prominent federal cases tend to only refer to physical invasions or the
underlying regulations within the character of government action
inquiry,75 the Alaska Supreme Court has used broader language. In the
landmark regulatory takings case Anchorage v. Sandberg,76 the court used
more inclusive language, asserting that “[g]overnment actions become
‘takings’ under principles of inverse condemnation when a private
landowner is forced to bear an unreasonable burden as a result of the
government’s exercise of power in the public interest.”77
Sandberg, decided a year after Lucas, involved Alaska’s designation
of several parcels of private land as parks, adversely affecting the plaintiff
company’s ability to develop on its own land by surrounding it with a
new park.78 Citing Lucas, the court held that there was no taking because
per se takings cover a narrow scope.79 The court held that plaintiffs can
invoke the doctrine solely during “(1) cases of physical invasion and (2)
cases where a regulation denies a landowner of all economically feasible
use of the property.”80
Unable to find a per se taking, the Sandberg court applied the three
Penn Central factors and inserted an additional consideration of “[t]he
legitimacy of the interest advanced by the regulation or land-use
decision” into its analysis of government action.81 Alaska courts have
74. Spinell Homes, Inc. v. Mun. of Anchorage, 78 P.3d 692, 702 (Alaska 2003)
(citing R & Y, Inc. v. Mun. of Anchorage, 34 P.3d 289 (Alaska 2001)).
75. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978) (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)) (“A ‘taking’ may more
readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a
physical invasion by government . . . than when interference arises from some
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote
the common good.”).
76. 861 P.2d 554 (Alaska 1993).
77. Id. at 558 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260–62 (1980)).
78. Id. at 555–56.
79. Id. at 557.
80. See id. (recognizing per se takings under Alaska law to include the Lucas
precedent). Since Sandberg, the Alaska Supreme Court has offered a slightly more
expansive definition of “regulation” for purposes of per se takings to potentially
include other government actions, but all have come as a result of some official
government act, whether through regulations, injunctions, or some form of
administrative adjudication. See, e.g., Beluga Mining Co. v. State Dep’t of Nat.
Res., 973 P.2d 570, 575 (Alaska 1999) (describing an injunction as a regulation
within the per se takings analysis); Cannone v. Noey, 867 P.2d 797, 798–801
(Alaska 1994) (discussing the possibility of a per se taking occurring as a result of
an administrative denial of a permit).
81. Sandberg, 861 P.2d at 557 (first citing State v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., 834
P.2d 134, 143 (Alaska 1991); and then citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,
260–61 (1980)); see also Hageland Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Harms, 210 P.3d 444, 450
n.21 (Alaska 2009) (clarifying the factor as a consideration within the government
action analysis).
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separately noted that “[t]he finding of a taking . . . depends on whether
someone has been deprived of the economic benefits of ownership, not
whether the State captures any of those benefits.”82 Moreover, the taking
or damaging of the property must have “been proximately caused by a
government entity.”83
In western and northern Alaska, Alaska Native villages sinking into
the ground as a direct result of permafrost melt and erosion have become
or will soon become impossible to live in.84 Like in Causby,85 the individual
Alaska Native property owners are left unable to enjoy any practical use
from their property: businesses cannot function, and people cannot live
on liquefying, eroding ground.86
While this appears to open the door for a per se takings claim, the
state action component currently presents a likely insurmountable
impediment. There is no regulation, injunction, or other immediately
obvious state action on which to ground a per se takings claim.87 This does
not mean that no takings claim exists but rather that a state court is likely
to require the Sandberg ad hoc approach, which considers the legitimacy
of state action.88
Alaska Native villages threatened by melting permafrost would
easily meet the first two Sandberg factors derived from Penn Central.
Under the economic impact element of the test, individual home- and
business-owners in Alaska Native villages need only show that their
living and working spaces have been severely impacted by the permafrost
melt and subsequent erosion.89 Given the wealth of documentation as to
82. Waiste v. State, 10 P.3d 1141, 1154 (Alaska 2000) (citing Stewart & Grindle,
Inc. v. State,
524 P.2d 1242, 1248 (Alaska 1974)).
83. Beeson v. City of Palmer, 370 P.3d 1084, 1088 (Alaska 2016) (first citing
Fairbanks N. Star Borough v. Lakeview Enters., Inc., 897 P.2d 47, 52 (Alaska 1995);
and then citing Bakke v. State, 744 P.2d 655, 657 (Alaska 1987)); see also discussion
infra Part IV.
84. See, e.g., GAO 2003 REPORT, supra note 37, at 8; GAO 2009 UPDATE, supra
note 38, at 7.
85. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 259 (1946).
86. See Alec Luhn, Slow-Motion Wrecks: How Thawing Permafrost is Destroying
Arctic Cities, GUARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/oct/14/thawing-permafrostdestroying-arctic-cities-norilsk-russia (discussing the effects of permafrost melt
on Arctic cities similar to problems faced by villages in Alaska).
87. See infra Part VI.
88. Anchorage v. Sandberg, 861 P.2d 554, 557 (Alaska 1993) (first citing State
v. Arctic Slope Reg’l Corp., 834 P.2d 134, 143 (Alaska 1991); and then citing Agins
v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260–61 (1980)).
89. See, e.g., id. at 558–59 (quoting Homeward Bound, Inc. v. Anchorage Sch.
Dist., 791 P.2d 610, 614 (Alaska 1990)) (noting that “[p]rivate property is taken or
damaged for constitutional purposes if the government deprives the owner of the
economic advantages of ownership” but also that “economic infeasibility” of
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the destruction being wrought, those economic impacts are undoubtedly
both significant and severe.90 Regarding their distinct investment-backed
interests, many of these villages have existed for decades, and some
families have lived in the area for thousands of years.91 By settling there
centuries ago, building houses, and investing in their communities,
Alaska Native residents created an obviously reasonable and investmentbacked expectation that they would continue to be able to live on the
land.92
Despite the strength of these two factors, finding a regulatory taking
requires finding that government action has actually occurred.93
Additionally, while Alaska’s constitution broadens takings to include
government-caused damage, Sandberg nonetheless requires a review of
the legitimacy of the government interest in the taking.94 Broadly
speaking, more legitimate government interests make courts less likely to
find that the government’s actions constitute a taking.95
While the destruction itself is obvious, tying that destruction to
actions by the Alaska government presents the biggest hurdle for any
takings claim against the state.

IV. ALASKA’S INVESTMENT IN OIL AS STATE ACTION
A potential plaintiff could argue that the Alaska state government,
through its continued actions participating in and promoting the oil and
gas industry, has both directly and indirectly caused the destruction of
the land on which Alaska Native villages sit.
development could also constitute a taking).
90. See, e.g., Luhn, supra note 86; Brian Kahn, Permafrost Melt Could Destroy a
Third of All Arctic Infrastructure, Affecting as Many as 4 Million People, GIZMODO
(Dec. 11, 2018, 11:11 AM), https://gizmodo.com/permafrost-melt-could-destroya-third-of-all-arctic-inf-1831011572.
91. See, e.g., The Village – Newtok, supra note 26 (describing thousands of years
of seasonal reliance on the land for the Qaluyaarmiut of Newtok and
documentation of the village itself beginning as early as 1949).
92. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978)
(discussing present and decades-long historic use of a property as an example of
what qualifies as a reasonable investment-backed expectation).
93. See id. at 128 (discussing the character of government action as one of the
elements of a regulatory takings claim); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1029 (1992) (recognizing regulation as an obvious form of government
action).
94. Sandberg, 861 P.2d at 557–58; R & Y, Inc. v. Mun. of Anchorage, 34 P.3d
289, 293 (Alaska 2001) (first citing Sandberg, 861 P.2d at 557; then citing Beluga
Mining Co. v. State, 973 P.2d 570, 575 (Alaska 1999); and then citing Cannone v.
Noey, 867 P.2d 797, 800 (Alaska 1994)).
95. See R & Y, Inc., 34 P.3d at 290 (“[T]he legitimacy of the [Municipality of
Anchorage]’s interest in restricting development in wetlands outweighs the
relatively minor impact its action had on the value of the land.”).
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Alaska’s history of drilling for oil goes back more than a century.96
Because of the state’s remote location, its oil extraction industry
developed slowly, but by the time Alaska acquired statehood in 1959,
Texaco, Mobil, Chevron, Shell, Marathon, and many other major U.S. oil
companies were investing in areas like the Swanson River oil field on the
Kenai Peninsula.97 However, in 1968, discovery of the Prudhoe Bay oil
field on Alaska’s North Slope, between the Alaska National Petroleum
Reserve and what would later become the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge, made Alaska a top American oil destination.98 At the time of this
discovery, it was estimated that ten billion barrels of crude oil lay under
the surface of Prudhoe Bay, the biggest oil reserve ever found under
American soil to that point.99 By the late 1970s, Alaska was the second
largest state producer of oil in the country, behind only Texas.100
The burgeoning interest in Alaska’s oil potential prompted the state
government to act. In 1969, new Prudhoe Bay oil leases alone brought in
$900 million for the state.101 These leases fundamentally altered Alaska’s
economic and political landscape: the 1970 state budget was expanded by
seventy-seven percent from the previous year,102 and a debate
immediately began about where to put the rest of the money.103 While
most of the funds were initially invested in U.S. Treasury notes and
bonds,104 Alaska quickly spent the lease sale revenue on capital projects
and state programs.105
Seeking a more long-term investment plan, the state government
proposed a constitutional amendment creating a permanent fund
96. Oil Discovery and Development in Alaska, ALASKA HUMANS. F.,
http://www.akhistorycourse.org/modern-alaska/oil-discovery-anddevelopment-in-alaska/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2022).
97. Id.
98. See Alaska Pipeline Chronology, PBS,
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/features/pipeline-alaskapipeline-chronology/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2022).
99. Oliver S. Goldsmith, Tracing the Growth of Alaska State Spending Since 1979,
at 4 (Univ. of Alaska Anchorage Inst. of Soc. & Econ. Rsch., Fiscal Pol’y Working
Paper No. 2, 1991).
100. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION IN SELECTED STATES
AND AREAS (JANUARY 1970–AUGUST 2018) (2018),
https://www.flickr.com/photos/eiagov/31791566138/.
101. Historical Timeline of the Fund and APFC, ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP.,
https://apfc.org/who-we-are/history-of-the-alaska-permanent-fund/timeline/
(last visited Feb. 20, 2022) [hereinafter Fund Timeline].
102. Wallace Turner, Oil Windfall Aids Alaska Revenue, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1971,
at 21.
103. Alaska Permanent Fund – Governance, ALASKA PERMANENT FUND CORP. 2
(2018),
http://www.akleg.gov/basis/get_documents.asp?session=30&docid=53843.
104. Turner, supra note 102, at 21.
105. Fund Timeline, supra note 101.
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designed to hold and invest revenue generated from the state’s oil
resources.106 In November 1976, Alaska citizens overwhelmingly
approved the amendment, officially creating the Alaska Permanent
Fund.107 Four years later, the legislature created the Alaska Permanent
Fund Corporation (APFC) to operate the fund.108 Alaska gave the APFC
fiduciary responsibilities for fund management and passed it into law
along with an exhaustive list of the financial securities in which the fund
could invest.109
In 1982, the Alaska legislature permitted the APFC to begin
disbursing dividends, providing each Alaskan $1,000 in the program’s
first year.110 In 1983, the exhaustive list of permitted investments was
altered to allow the APFC to invest in the stock market.111 By 1989, the
Alaska Permanent Fund was valued at $10 billion.112 By 2018, it crossed
$60 billion, and in 2020, the Alaska Permanent Fund became the largest
source of unrestricted general fund revenue in the state budget.113
A. The Legitimate State Interest
Sandberg analysis requires considering the legitimacy of the state
interest.114 Generally, the more legitimate the state interest, the more
likely a court is to find that a regulatory taking did not occur.115 However,
this legitimacy interest is weighed against the actual effect on the
property, meaning that even the most legitimate state interest cannot
overcome a finding that the property was wholly destroyed.116
Additionally, the legitimate state interest question is not a dispositive
factor but instead falls under the scope of consideration of the nature of
106. ALASKA DEP’T OF REVENUE, THE ALASKA PERMANENT FUND AND THE
PERMANENT FUND PROTECTION ACT (2017),
http://www.akleg.gov/basis/get_documents.asp?session=30&docid=661.
107. Fund Timeline, supra note 101.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Anchorage v. Sandberg, 861 P.2d 554, 557 (Alaska 1993) (contrasting
Lucas’s per se takings evaluation to an ad hoc analysis that involves an inquiry
into legitimate government interests).
115. See R & Y, Inc. v. Mun. of Anchorage, 34 P.3d 289, 290 (Alaska 2001)
(“[T]he legitimacy of the MOA’s interest in restricting development in wetlands
outweighs the relatively minor impact its action had on the value of the land.”).
116. See id. at 299 (validating the plaintiff’s assertion that a court would err in
finding that if the government “interest . . . is legitimate, no taking could be
found” by expressly recognizing that an adequate weighing of factors had
occurred).
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the government action.117 The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted
legitimate government interest generously, giving credence to a “broad
range of governmental purposes and regulations.”118 Alaska courts have
followed suit, broadly interpreting what constitutes a legitimate state
interest.119
For a potential plaintiff, the legitimacy of Alaska’s investment in oil
would be difficult to contest. The state statutory code explicitly proclaims
that “the people of Alaska have an interest in the development of the
state’s oil and gas resources.”120 The code then provides reasons for the
legitimacy of oil development, noting that “it is in the best interests of the
state . . . to encourage an assessment of its oil and gas resources.”121
Beyond the statutory language, given the court’s willingness to broadly
interpret legitimate interests, the fact that the state’s budget relies so
heavily on the Alaska Permanent Fund, and thus the oil extraction
industry, likely would independently establish such an interest.122
While appearing to present a barrier, the legitimate government
interest must still be weighed against the other factors, along with the
actual resulting harm.123 Because the Alaska Native villages are becoming
uninhabitable, so long as state action can be tied to the damage, the
legitimacy of the government interest is unlikely to destroy an inverse
condemnation takings claim.124

117. Hageland Aviation Servs., Inc. v. Harms, 210 P.3d 444, 449–50 (Alaska
2009).
118. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 (1987).
119. See, e.g., Holding v. Mun. of Anchorage, 63 P.3d 248, 251 (Alaska 2003)
(finding that the government had a legitimate interest in regulating adult-oriented
businesses).
120. ALASKA STAT. § 38.05.180(a)(1) (2021).
121. Id. § (a)(2).
122. Fund Timeline, supra note 101.
123. See, e.g., Waiste v. State, 10 P.3d 1141, 1150 n.44 (Alaska 2000) (discussing
how in United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 57–59 (1993),
government action in furtherance of a legitimate interest was done in a way that
resulted in a taking); Vanek v. State, 193 P.3d 283, 293 n.64 (Alaska 2008) (citing
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540–43 (2005) saying the “formula
inquiring whether government regulation ‘substantially advances’ a legitimate
state interest is a due process inquiry and not an appropriate test for determining
whether a taking has occurred”); R & Y, Inc. v. Mun. of Anchorage, 34 P.3d 289,
290 (Alaska 2001) (“[T]he legitimacy of the MOA’s interest in restricting
development in wetlands outweighs the relatively minor impact its action had on
the value of the land.”).
124. This legal claim does not threaten Alaska’s dividend nor its legitimacy, it
merely notes the connection between Alaska’s dividend and its private oil
extraction industry to advocate for compensation resulting from the destruction
of Alaska Native property.
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B. The Case for a State Government Action
A potential plaintiff introducing an inverse condemnation claim
could present Alaska’s leasing of state land for oil and gas drilling as a
state government action. While government action in regulatory takings
typically derives from a specific regulation, no such regulation is
necessary to succeed under a Sandberg analysis, especially when the result
is not a physical taking of land but the destruction of it.125 In an inverse
condemnation lawsuit against Alaska, potential plaintiffs could present
their cases by either (1) claiming that the state oil leases themselves
constitute direct, legitimate government actions, thereby coupling the
state with the burning of fossil fuels, or (2) claiming that the state
government’s actions were both direct and indirect: not only did the
leasing of oil yoke the state to the industry, the state also supported the
oil extraction industry’s growth and development for the primary
purpose of extracting oil to be burned.
Both approaches require concluding that oil extraction was mainly
for the purposes of burning. When the oil extraction industry in Alaska
was finding its footing in the 1970s,126 the vast majority of crude oil was
refined for the purposes of transportation and industry.127 At the time, in
the United States, a significant amount of petroleum was burned for use
in electricity generation.128 Most of the oil used in transportation,
electricity generation, and industry is derived from gasoline, distillate
fuel oil, and jet fuel.129 The same was still true in 2017, when the average
125. See Anchorage v. Sandberg, 861 P.2d 554, 558 (Alaska 1993), overruled on
other grounds by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540–42 (2005)
(“Government actions become ‘takings’ under principles of inverse condemnation
when a private land owner is forced to bear an unreasonable burden as a result of
the government’s exercise of power in the public interest.”).
126. See Alaska Pipeline Chronology, supra note 98 (describing the start to
Alaska’s oil development mainly following the discovery of the Prudhoe Bay oil
reserve in the late 1960s and the construction of the pipeline in the 1970s).
127. See Oil Total Final Consumption by Sector, 1971–2018, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY
(Sept. 4, 2020), https://www.iea.org/data-and-statistics/charts/oil-total-finalconsumption-by-sector-1971-2018 (reporting that most of the use of oil in the
1970s was taken up by a combination of “Road,” “Aviation,” “Rail,”
“Navigation,” and “Industry”).
128. See MICHAEL RATNER & CAROL GLOVER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40187, U.S.
ENERGY: OVERVIEW AND KEY STATISTICS 7–8 (2014) (stating that, in 1970, residential
and commercial energy accounted for fifteen percent of petroleum use). Those
numbers have since decreased. See id. (stating that the percentage of residential
and commercial energy generated from petroleum decreased to five percent by
2005).
129. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS EXPLAINED: USE
OF OIL (May 10, 2021), https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-andpetroleum-products/use-of-oil.php. Distillate fuel oil is used to make diesel fuel.
Id.
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barrel of crude oil “would break down to about twenty gallons of
gasoline, two gallons of hydrocarbon gas liquids, one gallon of heavy fuel
oil, four gallons of jet fuel, eleven gallons of ultra-low sulfur distillate, six
gallons of other products, and less than one gallon of other distillates
(heating oil).”130 These oil products—when used to generate energy in
vehicles, manufacturing plants, and homes—are all burned.131
1. Approaching Government Action Directly
The direct approach is relatively simple: Alaska maintains leases
with dozens of oil companies for continued extraction.132 In total, Alaska
currently leases more than two million land acres and more than 960,000
offshore acres of state property.133 According to state government records,
Alaska has signed more than 12,500 oil and gas leases for extraction
purposes since 1959.134 Those leases generally grant the lessees a real
property interest in the leased area.135 This transfer of property interest
constitutes a tangible, direct action that the Alaska government has taken
extensively and consistently since it was first formed.136 Alaska sold these
leases for the primary purpose of drilling for oil (and natural gas)—fossil
fuels that directly contribute to the increase of global temperatures and
the melting of the permafrost.137

130. Isaac S. Simonelli, Where Does All That Oil Go?, ALASKA BUS., Oct. 2, 2018,
at 8, https://www.akbizmag.com/industry/oil-gas/where-does-all-that-oilgo/.
131. See Petroleum, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC RES. LIBR.,
https://www.nationalgeographic.org/encyclopedia/petroleum/ (last visited
Oct. 31, 2021) (describing how products like gasoline are burned to produce
energy). Separate arguments can also be made that the extraction, transportation,
and processing of the oil constitute significant additional contributions to the
melting of the permafrost, but in the interest of clarity and concision, this Note
only discusses burning.
132. See generally, ALASKA DIV. OF OIL & GAS, ACREAGE BY LESSEE – SUMMARY
(2021) (Jan. 4, 2022), at 1–3,
https://dog.dnr.alaska.gov/Documents/Leasing/PeriodicReports/Lease_Acre
ageByLesseeSummary.pdf (listing the fifty-five people and entities Alaska
currently leases land to for purposes of oil extraction).
133. Id.
134. See ALASKA DIV. OF OIL & GAS, LEASE STATUS (2021) (Jan. 4, 2022),
https://dog.dnr.alaska.gov/Documents/Leasing/PeriodicReports/Lease_Lease
Status.pdf [hereinafter ALASKA LEASE STATUS] (listing 12,514 records of “Oil & Gas
Comp” leases, the earliest Dec. 10, 1959 and the latest June 9, 2021).
135. Frederick J. Odsen, Complex Oil Laws Significant to Individual Investors,
ALASKA J. COM. (Mar. 9, 2003, 8:00 PM),
https://www.alaskajournal.com/community/2003-03-10/complex-oil-gaslaws-significant-individual-investors.
136. ALASKA LEASE STATUS, supra note 134.
137. See infra Part V.
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2. Approaching Government Action as a Direct/Indirect Hybrid
The hybrid approach also requires evaluating these leases, but only
as one component, albeit a central one, of Alaska’s total government
action. Through this lens, the leases are part of a broader transaction in
which the State of Alaska has promoted the construction of major private
oil infrastructure and permanently coupled the state’s revenue stream
with its oil extraction and transportation industries. Alaska’s leases on the
North Slope from 1964 to the early 1970s proved to be extremely lucrative
following the discovery of the Prudhoe Bay oil reserve.138 Northern
Alaska was so remote it was difficult to move the product once it had been
drilled, but the Prudhoe Bay investments were evidently not for the
purposes of keeping the oil solely within state borders.139 In 1970, Alaska
had an estimated three hundred thousand residents,140 and based on the
average pace of oil consumption in the U.S., it would have taken well over
one thousand years for Alaska alone to use the estimated ten billion
barrels of oil in the Prudhoe Bay reserve.141 It was therefore inevitable that
those drilling oil in Alaska intended for it to be transported out of the
state.142
After years of planning, the region’s largest oil leaseholders formed
the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company to prepare for the construction of
138. ALASKA J. COM., AN ALASKA OIL PATCH TIMELINE (2007),
https://www.alaskajournal.com/community/2007-06-24/alaska-oil-patchtimeline.
139. See Henry Myers, Federal Decisionmaking and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, 4
ECOLOGY L. Q., 915, 915 (1975) (discussing the immediate need for long-range
transport solutions of North Slope-drilled oil).
140. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL POPULATION CHANGE DATA (1910–2020)
(Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/timeseries/dec/popchange-data-text.html.
141. See Alaska Pipeline Chronology, supra note 98. Assuming the per capita
average oil consumption for the country, each Alaska resident used somewhere
around 23.6 barrels of oil that year and the state used an estimated 7,080,000
barrels. In 1970, the U.S. per capita oil consumption was estimated at 40,174 kWh.
Statistical Review of World Energy – All Data, 1965–2020, BRIT. PETROLEUM,
https://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/businesssites/en/global/corporate/xlsx/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-statsreview-2021-all-data.xlsx (last visited Oct. 31, 2021). Each barrel of oil is equivalent
to about 1,700 kWh of energy. Adam Hayes, Barrel of Oil Equivalent (BOE),
INVESTOPEDIA (May 20, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/barrelofoilequivalent.asp. In 1970,
each Alaska resident therefore used about 23.6 barrels of oil. This very rough
calculation—which does not account for potential discrepancies in Alaska’s per
capita oil consumption compared to that of other states—results in an estimate of
1,412 years.
142. See Alaska Pipeline Chronology, supra note 98 (describing the almostimmediate planning by Atlantic Richfield, Humble Oil, and British Petroleum Oil
to develop a Trans-Alaska Pipeline System to ease the transport of oil out of the
state).
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a pipeline north to south across the state from Prudhoe Bay to Valdez.143
While the project itself was privately funded and mostly concerned U.S.
government permitting,144 the State of Alaska participated with right-ofway and special land permits.145 Alaska was also aligned with propipeline interests in pipeline-related lawsuits prior to its construction.146
Once the pipeline was completed in 1977,147 its oil output increased every
year until 1988, reaching a maximum of more than two million barrels per
day.148
Even if the Alaska government did not construct or fund the pipeline
directly, its leases in the North Slope and continued presence in the
process of pipeline construction demonstrate indirect involvement in the
eventual dissemination of Alaska’s oil across the country149 and,
eventually, the world.150
Moreover, by marrying its interests to those of the oil extraction
industry through the Alaska Permanent Fund, a potential plaintiff could
argue that the state has taken indirect actions that have led to the
destruction of Alaska Native villages. The plaintiff could argue that
Alaska’s intentional actions have made it so that the state cannot decouple
itself from its oil, offering companies and investors assurance that it will
continue to prop up the industry indefinitely. The invested money from
leases now constitutes the largest contributor to Alaska’s yearly budget,

143. Id. As early as 1970, there was major concern regarding the potential for
such a pipeline to itself melt Alaska’s permafrost. ARTHUR H. LACHENBRUCH, U.S.
DEP’T. OF THE INTERIOR, GEOLOGICAL SURV., SOME ESTIMATES OF THE THERMAL
EFFECTS OF A HEATED PIPELINE IN PERMAFROST (1970). These concerns do not
remotely compare with the effect on permafrost the product within the pipeline
has had and will continue to have. See discussion infra Part V.
144. Alaska Pipeline Chronology, supra note 98.
145. Wilderness Soc’y. v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842, 848 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
146. Id.
147. Alaska Pipeline Chronology, supra note 98.
148. TAPS Throughput Barrels per Day, ALASKA DEP’T. OF NAT. RES. DIV. OF OIL
& GAS, https://dog.dnr.alaska.gov/information/data (scroll down to “Alaska’s
Oil / Gas Production” and click it; then scroll down to the second chart labelled
“TAPS Throughput Barrels per Day”) (last visited Nov. 1, 2021).
149. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ALASKA PROFILE ANALYSIS (Jan. 21, 2021),
https://www.eia.gov/state/analysis.php?sid=AK (noting that most of Alaska’s
crude oil gets shipped to Washington or California for refining).
150. See, e.g., Robert Tuttle, Alaska Oil Exports Soar as China Picks Up Slack from
West Coast, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 3, 2020, 6:00 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-03/alaska-oil-exportssoar-as-china-picks-up-slack-from-west-coast (Alaska starting exports to China);
Michael Muskal, Alaska Oil, Exported for First Time in a Decade, Heads to South Korea,
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2014, 1:03 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-alaska-oil-export-southkorea-20140930-story.html (Alaska starting exports to South Korea).
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demonstrating the state’s complete reliance on the extraction of oil.151 The
creation of the Alaska Permanent Fund tied Alaska to the fate of the fossil
fuels being removed from under its soil.152 Even in its name, the state
declared that the Alaska Permanent Fund would be perpetual.
Coupled with the arguments about Alaska’s initial support of
extraction, a potential plaintiff could craft a narrative that the state
entered the oil business through its leases, supported the business’s
growth by encouraging the construction of a pipeline, and then anchored
itself to the oil extraction industry through the Alaska Permanent Fund.
Even if the oil companies themselves were shipping, refining, and selling
oil and their customers were then burning it, Alaska’s role in the process
was significant and could therefore be considered government action for
purposes of a Sandberg takings inquiry.

V. TYING GOVERNMENT ACTIONS TO MELTING PERMAFROST
Potential inverse condemnation takings claims under Sandberg
would need to connect Alaska’s actions to the actual harmful results. This
can be a difficult task, even in cases where there are plainly written, easily
connectable regulations. Drawing links between slightly less-tangible
government actions and their results will prove challenging.153 To be
successful, a potential plaintiff must first connect climate change to
permafrost melt, then explain the anthropogenic (human-created) cause
of that climate change, and finally argue that Alaska’s direct or hybrid
actions are substantial contributors to that anthropogenic climate change.
A. Climate Change is Causing Alaska’s Permafrost to Melt
Alaska is facing major climate change as a result of human activity.
Global warming in particular has been the biggest culprit: winters from
2014 to 2018 in much of the state were more than 5 °F warmer than the
state average from 1981 to 2014.154 In Western Alaska, the average year151. See Fund Timeline, supra note 101 (“2020 | The Fund is a significant
contribution within the State’s overall fiscal summary and becomes Alaska’s #1
source of unrestricted general fund revenues for the State’s budget given the
decline in oil prices.”).
152. Id.
153. See infra Part VII.
154. Rick Thoman & John E. Walsh, Alaska’s Changing Environment:
Documenting Alaska’s Physical and Biological Changes Through Observations, INT’L
ARCTIC RSCH. CTR., UNIV. OF ALASKA FAIRBANKS 5 (2019). In December 2021, Kodiak
measured temperatures as high as 67 °F, more than 20 °F hotter than any previous
December record. Matthew Cappucci & Emily Schwing, Alaska Hits 67 Degrees,
Setting New December Record, WASH. POST, (Dec. 28, 2021, 4:17 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/weather/2021/12/28/alaska-record-
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round temperature from 1969 to 2018 increased 4.3 °F.155 Alaska’s
permafrost is following the same pattern of warming: since the 1980s, the
average temperatures of the state’s permafrost have risen in every
measured location,156 and in some by as much as 4 °F.157 High belowground temperatures have resulted in more seasonal thaw depth,
reaching as much as thirty-three inches in some places in 2018.158 By
comparison, less than a decade earlier that melt averaged twenty to
twenty-four inches.159
Although the present state of permafrost melt is serious, future
global temperature warming presents an even dimmer picture. If global
air temperatures rise 5.4 °F, estimates suggest thirty-five to eighty percent
of all arctic top permafrost layers could be lost.160 In the coming decades,
this is especially alarming. Alaska’s air temperatures are expected to rise
between 3.5 °F and 7 °F by 2050.161 If emissions are not substantially
reduced, Alaska could become 13 °F warmer by the end of the century.162
Even the most optimistic projections, which account for a dramatic
reduction in emissions, expect at least 5 °F of warming by 2100.163
However, global warming is not the only cause of permafrost melt;
another effect of climate change, increased rainfall, is also a major
contributor.164 Summer rainfall has not been consistent in recent years in
Alaska: while 2014 and 2016 were some of the wettest summers recorded,
temperatures-climate/.
155. Thoman & Walsh, supra note 154, at 5.
156. Vladimir E. Romanovsky et al., Arctic Report Card: Update for 2017:
Terrestrial Permafrost, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Nov. 28, 2017),
https://www.arctic.noaa.gov/Report-Card/Report-Card2017/ArtMID/7798/ArticleID/694/
Terrestrial-Permafrost.
157. Michaeleen Doucleff, Is There a Ticking Time Bomb Under the Arctic?, NAT’L
PUB. RADIO (Jan. 24, 2018, 4:37 AM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/01/24/575220206/isthere-a-ticking-time-bomb-under-the-arctic.
158. Thoman & Walsh, supra note 154, at 11.
159. Id.
160. See Alina Bykova, Permafrost Thaw in a Warming World: The Arctic
Institute’s Permafrost Series Fall–Winter 2020, THE ARCTIC INST. (Oct. 1, 2020),
https://www.thearcticinstitute.org/permafrost-thaw-warming-world-arcticinstitute-permafrost-series-fall-winter-2020/ (mentioning a three-degree Celsius
increase—equivalent to a 5.4 °F increase—resulting in a thirty to eighty-five
percent loss of top permafrost layers).
161. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 139 (Thomas R.
Karl et al. eds., 2009).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Thomas A. Douglas et al., Increased Rainfall Stimulates Permafrost Thaw
Across a Variety of Interior Alaskan Boreal Ecosystems, 3 NATURE PARTNER JS. CLIMATE
& ATMOSPHERIC SCI., no. 28, 1, 1 (2020),
https://www.nature.com/articles/s41612-020-0130-4.
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2013, 2015, and 2017 were between average and dry.165 However,
permafrost thaw increased during wet summers, especially during major
precipitation events.166 After those high-precipitation summers—most
notably 2014, the wettest year ever recorded in Alaska—the permafrost
did not recover to its pre-wet summer levels, even in subsequent drier
years.167
Even more alarmingly, permafrost melt has created a feedback loop
that may be too late to reverse. Global permafrost is estimated to hold
about twice the amount of carbon currently in the atmosphere, mostly in
the form of tens of thousands of years of undecomposed organic matter.168
As permafrost melts, this organic matter becomes exposed to
decomposition, which then releases carbon into the atmosphere.169 The
release of carbon warms the atmosphere further, causing greater
permafrost melt, which releases even more carbon.170 Not only has this
process already begun, but some predict that the “point of no return” has
already been reached: permafrost will continue to melt even if all humanrelated carbon release ceases immediately.171 This does not hinder an
argument reliant on the connection being drawn between people and
climate change because the massive carbon reserves held by permafrost
have yet to be released, and any damage they may cause in the future has
yet to be realized.172
B. Anthropogenic Actions as the Cause of Climate Change
One clear consensus has been reached within the scientific
community: climate change is caused primarily by human activity.173
165. Id. at 2.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 3–4.
168. Susan M. Natali et al., Permafrost Carbon Feedbacks Threaten Global Climate
Goals, 118 PNAS, no. 21, 1, 1 (2021),
https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/118/21/e2100163118.full.pdf.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Jorgen Randers & Ulrich Goluke, An Earth System Model Shows SelfSustained Thawing of Permafrost Even If All Man-Made GHG Emissions Stop in 2020,
10 SCI. REPS., no. 18456, 1, 8 (2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598020-75481-z.
172. See id. at 7–8 (discussing how permafrost-captured carbon being released
is something that can be addressed now, but its effects will be felt in the “centuries
ahead”).
173. See Scientific Consensus: Earth’s Climate Is Warming, NAT’L AERONAUTICS &
SPACE ADMIN. GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, https://climate.nasa.gov/scientificconsensus/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2021) (citing reports from major U.S. scientific
societies, science academies, U.S. government agencies, and the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change all recognizing that humans are the

39.1 KAHN (DO NOT DELETE)

2022

5/2/2022 9:48 AM

IT TAKES A VILLAGE

129

Both federal174 and Alaska175 courts recognize this fact. There is no further
inquiry needed into the merits of an argument that climate change is
anthropogenic.
C. Alaska’s Government Action as a Tangible Contributor to
Anthropogenic Climate Change
For potential inverse condemnation takings claims, the causal chain
must then conclude with the proposition that Alaska’s actions have
contributed to the climate change causing the permafrost melt. Under
both the direct and hybrid approaches, the government action involved
relates to the extraction of oil. Although the hybrid approach also
introduces harder-to-quantify factors like long-term reliance interests and
state support of private investment, these factors nonetheless are wholly
reliant on the burning of Alaska’s oil being the cause of Alaska’s
permafrost melt.
Between 1988 and 2020, extraction from land leased by the State of
Alaska produced over 12.7 billion barrels of oil.176 Additionally, between
1973 and 1988, the state extracted an estimated 6.5 billion barrels.177 In
total, since the early 1970s, state leases have produced roughly 19.2 billion
barrels of oil. No available data exist that indicate what percentage of that
oil has gone into production for gasoline, diesel fuel, jet fuel, or other
purposes.178 However, most of it is being and has been burned for
transportation purposes, much like national averages.179
primary cause of climate change).
174. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 523 (2007) (noting that the
“EPA does not dispute the existence of a causal connection between manmade
greenhouse gas emissions and global warming”); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v.
Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 538 F.3d 1172, 1214 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting
that the “NHTSA does not dispute that . . . ‘fuel economy improvements could
have a significant impact on the rate of CO2 accumulation in the atmosphere,’
which would affect climate change”).
175. See Kanuk v. State, Dep’t of Nat. Res., 335 P.3d 1088, 1097 (Alaska 2014)
(“[T]he science of anthropogenic climate change is compelling . . . .”).
176. See Annual Gross Oil Production from State Lands, ALASKA DEP’T OF NAT.
RES. DIV. OF OIL & GAS, https://dog.dnr.alaska.gov/information/data (scroll
down to “Alaska’s Oil / Gas Production” and click it; it is the first chart labelled
“Annual Gross Oil Production from State Lands”) (last visited Jan. 17, 2022)
(adding together annual output from 1988 to 2020).
177. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ALASKA FIELD PRODUCTION OF CRUDE OIL
(2021),
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=pet&s=mcrfpak2&f
=a (estimating individual year averages by multiplying day-averages by 365 and
adding together all years from 1973 to 1987).
178. See Simonelli, supra note 130 (discussing only the national average oil
barrel breakdown estimated by the U.S. Energy Information Administration).
179. See id. (“About 90 percent of the about 236,000 barrels of crude oil the

39.1 KAHN (DO NOT DELETE)

130

5/2/2022 9:48 AM

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

Vol. 39:1

Several greenhouse gases are released when oil products are burned,
including small amounts of methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O), but
carbon dioxide (CO2) is by far the largest gas byproduct by quantity.180
While a potential lawsuit might include other greenhouse gases, this Note
will focus only on the release of CO2 because of its sheer prevalence in the
atmosphere. Relying on national averages, each barrel of oil produces
roughly 0.43 metric tons of CO2 when burned.181 Since 1973, that means
Alaska’s government has contributed to the release of an estimated 8.3
billion metric tons of CO2, with 5.5 billion released since 1988.
Atmospheric CO2 is typically measured in parts per million (ppm)
by volume.182 One ppm of atmospheric CO2 is the equivalent of 2.13
gigatons (2,130,000,000 metric tons) of released carbon.183 One metric ton
of carbon converts to 3.664 metric tons of CO2.184 This means that every
7.8 billion tons of CO2 released into the atmosphere adds roughly an
additional part per million. Alaska’s output has crossed this threshold,
adding an estimated 1.064 parts per million of CO2 to the atmosphere.
Pre-industrialization, the atmosphere averaged 280 ppm of CO2.185
When the U.S. granted Alaska statehood in January 1959, CO2
concentration was measured at 315.58 ppm.186 By January 1973 it was at
328.55 ppm.187 By January 2022, atmospheric CO2 rose to about 418.19
ppm.188 Alaska’s 1.064 ppm oil-burning contribution therefore accounts

Cherry Point facility processes each day ends up as transportation fuel.”).
180. Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, ENV’T PROT. AGENCY,
https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gasemissions#transportation (last updated July 27, 2021).
181. Greenhouse Gases Equivalencies Calculator – Calculations and References,
ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/energy/greenhouse-gasesequivalencies-calculator-calculations-and-references (last updated Apr. 28, 2021).
182. See, e.g., Rebecca Lindsey, Climate Change: Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide,
NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., CLIMATE.GOV (Oct. 7, 2021),
https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climatechange-atmospheric-carbon-dioxide (describing atmospheric carbon dioxide
analysis using parts per million).
183. Conversion Tables, CARBON DIOXIDE INFO. ANALYSIS CTR. (1990) (modified
from CARBON DIOXIDE REVIEW: 1982, at 467 (W.C. Clark ed., 1982)),
https://web.archive.org/web/20170118004650/http://cdiac.ornl.gov/pns/con
vert.html.
184. Id.
185. Lindsey, supra note 182.
186. Monthly Mean CO2 Constructed from Daily Mean Values, NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (2022),
https://gml.noaa.gov/webdata/ccgg/trends/co2/co2_mm_mlo.txt (last visited
Mar. 6, 2022).
187. Id. 1973 is the earliest year for which data about Alaskan oil extraction are
available.
188. Id.
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for roughly 1.2% of all CO2 added to the atmosphere since 1973.189
Measuring global temperature is a difficult task because
measurements can vary substantially based on elevation, measurement
tools, and inevitable interferences with measurements.190 However,
global temperatures strongly correlate with atmospheric CO2.191 A
National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration report described a
simple correlation: “When the carbon dioxide concentration goes up,
temperature goes up. When the carbon dioxide concentration goes down,
temperature goes down.”192 In recent decades, as atmospheric CO2 has
steadily risen, so too has global temperature.193 In the past fifty years,
estimates suggest that the increase has been about two degrees
Fahrenheit194 and shows signs of acceleration.195
Alaska’s quantifiable contribution to global temperature change is
nearly impossible to determine, given the lack of available information
about how the state’s oil is used and the unreliability of current
temperature change estimates. However, two known factors remain
significant: the certainty in the fact that most of Alaska’s oil has been
burned for fuel and the estimable effect this has had on atmospheric CO2
concentration. These could be enough for a court to find that Alaska’s
actions have had a tangible impact on atmospheric warming, and thus the
melting of the permafrost, resulting in the destruction of Alaska Native
village properties.
Up to this point, each argument discussed presents an opportunity
for a court to take the side of Native Alaska villagers in a suit against the
state, but numerous challenges exist that make such a possibility unlikely.
Primary among these hurdles is the question of proximate cause.
189. Between 1973 and 2022, an additional 89.64 ppm of CO2 was introduced
to the atmosphere (calculated by taking the 1973 number and subtracting it from
the 2022 number). Alaska’s contribution, 1.064 ppm, is 1.2% of 89.64. Alaska is
therefore responsible for roughly 1.2% of the increase in CO2 in the atmosphere
between 1973 and 2022.
190. Taking the Earth’s Temperature, AM. CHEM. SOC’Y,
https://www.acs.org/content/acs/en/climatescience/energybalance/earthtem
perature.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2022).
191. NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., NAT’L CTRS. FOR ENV’T INFO.,
TEMPERATURE CHANGE & CARBON DIOXIDE CHANGE,
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/global-warming/temperature-change (last visited
Jan. 17, 2022).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. World of Change: Global Temperatures, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.
EARTH OBSERVATORY, https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/world-ofchange/global-temperatures (last visited Jan. 17, 2022).
195. Steven J. Smith et al., Near-Term Acceleration in the Rate of Temperature
Change, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 333, 335 (2015),
https://www.nature.com/articles/nclimate2552.pdf.
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VI. STATE ACTION AND PROXIMATE CAUSE
With the argument for cause developed, a potential plaintiff must
make the case that Alaska’s involvement has been the proximate cause of
the inverse condemnation of Alaska Native village property. Discussed
in Bakke v. State196 and clarified in Beeson v. City of Palmer,197 proximate
cause for the purpose of takings law in Alaska requires a basic finding
that “the injury would not have occurred ‘but for the act’ and reasonable
persons would regard this act ‘as a cause and attach responsibility to
it.’”198 Proximate cause was first introduced as an element of an Alaska
inverse condemnation question in Bakke, where a mudslide began on state
property and destroyed a private plaintiff’s property downslope; the
court asked whether “the injury would have happened in exactly the
same manner in the absence of the act.”199 However, borrowing from tort
law to alter the test, Beeson established that for a state action “to be
proximate[,] a cause must have been more likely than not a substantial
factor in bringing about the injury.”200 The court also noted that “[t]his
does not preclude the possibility that there can be multiple substantial
causes of damage.”201
A. The Case for Proximate Cause
Under either the hybrid or direct approach, the most robust case for
proximate cause is that Alaska’s leases served a singular purpose: to
promote the extraction of oil.202 Under the hybrid approach, Alaska was
further involved because it encouraged the state’s oil boom.203 Under
either approach, the state encouraged oil extraction, and that oil was used
almost exclusively for combustion.204 The combustion of oil is one of the
leading causes of CO2 emissions.205 CO2 emissions directly impact
warming global temperatures.206 Warming global temperatures are

196. 744 P.2d 655, 656 (Alaska 1987).
197. 370 P.3d 1084, 1089 (Alaska 2016).
198. Id. (quoting Bakke, 744 P.2d at 656).
199. Bakke, 744 P.2d at 656.
200. Beeson, 370 P.3d at 1090.
201. Id. (emphasis added).
202. See supra Sections IV(A)–(B).
203. Id.
204. See discussion supra Part IV.
205. See Fossil Fuels, ENV’T & ENERGY STUDY INST.,
https://www.eesi.org/topics/fossil-fuels/description (last visited Jan. 19, 2022)
(“[I]n 2020, oil combustion was responsible for 45 percent of U.S. energy-related
carbon dioxide emissions.”).
206. See discussion supra Section V(A).
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causing the permafrost in Alaska to melt.207 The melting permafrost is
making property in dozens of Alaska Native villages unlivable.208
The move from the more stringent Bakke “exactly the same manner”
analysis to the less stringent Beeson “multiple substantial causes” inquiry
suggests that Alaska’s modern jurisprudential interpretation of inverse
condemnation doctrine welcomes a broader range of possible
contributions to an overall destructive result. Because of the scale of
international CO2 emissions209 and with the continued extraction of oil
across the globe,210 the chances are low of a court finding that the
permafrost melt and destruction of Alaska Native villagers’ property
would not have occurred in the “exact same manner.” Without any
concrete understanding of what might have happened had Alaska not
entered into oil leases, supported the development of the pipeline, and
anchored itself to the fate of its oil extraction industry, a court would
likely fall back on the idea that nothing would have been different:
another source of oil would have been found somewhere else, and the
same CO2 would have been pumped into the atmosphere.
By contrast, the Beeson “substantial factor” analysis that considers
multiple causes is slightly more favorable to potential inverse
condemnation takings claims arising out of the melting permafrost.
Alaska’s oil accounts for a quantifiable portion of global CO2, which
impacts global temperature.211 While that number is objectively small,
Alaska courts have not drawn clear lines as to what constitutes a
substantial contribution.212 Many other contributing factors do not, by
themselves, impede an argument that Alaska has been a substantial
contributor to the global temperature rise that has caused the permafrost
to melt. There is therefore no need to consider hypothetical realities.
With tangible actions that have substantially contributed to tangible
results, a takings claim may theoretically survive the proximate cause
inquiry. However, even with the less stringent standard, the proximate
cause inquiry presents the biggest challenge to an Alaska Native villager’s
success in court. While both the direct and hybrid approaches carry
distinct advantages, both may fall short due to current legal standards.
207. See supra Part II.
208. Id.
209. See discussion supra Section V(A).
210. See, e.g., World Energy & Climate Statistics – Yearbook 2021: Crude Oil
Production, ENERDATA, https://yearbook.enerdata.net/crude-oil/worldproduction-statistics.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2022) (showing the continued
global production of oil).
211. See discussion supra Section V(A).
212. See, e.g., Beeson v. City of Palmer, 370 P.3d 1084, 1090 (Alaska 2016)
(failing to clarify what could have qualified as “substantial” for purposes of
inverse condemnation analysis).
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However, this could change in the future.
B. Proximate Cause as the Undoing of Both the Direct and Hybrid
Approaches to State Action
The direct approach is named for its simplicity. Rather than opening
the legal inquiry to the intricacies of Alaska’s investment and support of
the oil extraction industry, where money was not changing hands and the
tangibility of the “action” proves somewhat ambiguous, the direct
approach simply relies on the thousands of leases Alaska has proffered to
oil companies. These leases are easily identifiable and thus allay concerns
that an argument for a taking might devolve into a confusing mess of
tangible and intangible factors on a long causal chain.
By contrast, the hybrid approach better enables a plaintiff to present
Alaska’s role as a consistent, actively participating party in the production
of state oil. But bolstering the state action portion of the argument comes
at the cost of diluting the significance of tangible state action oil leases.
Under either approach, the current jurisprudence does not favor a
potential plaintiff. An Alaska court will need to acknowledge both that a
causal chain exists and that Alaska’s actions were the proximate cause of
the resulting damage to Alaska Natives.213 Although the substantial factor
test for inverse condemnation takings claims has not been clarified since
Beeson,214 thus leaving it open for interpretation, the causal chain likely
falls short. The sales of the leases, potentially coupled with long-term state
investment in oil, has contributed little more than one percent to global
CO2.215 This does not take into account the more direct instigators that are
the oil companies themselves, nor does it correspond to actual
contributions to global warming, which is correlated with CO2 but has
many other contributing factors.216 While not directly addressed in Alaska
courts, other U.S. courts, relying on slightly different standards, have
refused to find causation resulting from individual entities’ contributions
to climate change.217 For these reasons, based on current jurisprudence

213. See supra Part VI.
214. Beeson has not been cited for its “substantial factor” test, and no Alaska
court has discussed the test since the Beeson decision in 2016.
215. See supra Section V(C).
216. See The Causes of Climate Change, NAT’L AERONAUTICS & SPACE ADMIN.
GLOB. CLIMATE CHANGE, https://climate.nasa.gov/causes/ (last visited Jan. 19,
2022) (listing some of the contributing factors to earth’s warming, including water
vapor, methane, nitrous oxide, and chlorofluorocarbons).
217. See Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d 863,
881–82 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (failing to find a traceable link between oil, energy, and
utility companies’ emissions and any resulting arctic sea ice melt), aff’d, 696 F.3d
849 (9th Cir. 2012).
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and climate science, it appears unlikely that Alaska courts would
complete the causal chain to find an inverse condemnation from
permafrost melt.

VII. OTHER MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS IN THE EFFICACY OF AN
INVERSE CONDEMNATION TAKINGS CLAIM
An Alaska Native lawsuit against the State of Alaska for takings
faces myriad challenges, even beyond the issue of proximate cause. While
this Note seeks to present the strongest legal argument for a favorable
outcome, many additional factors present obstacles not yet addressed.
Two stand out as especially adverse to the success of an inverse
condemnation claim deriving damage from Alaska’s melting permafrost.
First, any American environmental restitution case must overcome a
massive hurdle: U.S. courts appear relatively unready or unwilling to
treat climate change with a level of urgency comparable to the threat it
actually poses to the country. Second, even if proximate cause and the
jurisprudential aversion to climate change are overcome, takings law only
presents a partial solution to the issues facing Alaska Native villages.
A. American Courts are Not Prepared for a Climate Reckoning
In recent decades, cases responding to the effects of climate change
have given momentum to the reappropriation of old doctrines for modern
environmental purposes.218 While there are many reasons to be optimistic
about judicial recognition of climate change, takings doctrine in Alaska is
likely not ready to break new ground, even as the ground continues to
break.
Climate change has been an issue in hundreds of cases,219 and a
central component of some major decisions in the past several decades.220
However, courts have consistently turned to several jurisprudential
barriers that have undermined climate advocates’ abilities to succeed.

218. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Keynote Address: The Alaska Constitution and
the Future of Individual Rights, 35 ALASKA L. REV. 117, 122 (2018) (discussing the
public trust doctrine as a possible frontier for environmental litigation in Alaska).
219. See U.S. Climate Change Litigation, COLUM. LAW SCH. SABIN CTR. FOR
CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, http://climatecasechart.com/climate-changelitigation/us-climate-change-litigation/ (last visited Jan. 19, 2022) (citing
hundreds of cases about climate change).
220. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (discussing the EPA’s
ability to regulate and promulgate emission standards for carbon dioxide); Comer
v. Murphy Oil, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009) (considering the justiciability of
multiple claims against oil companies for their contributions to greenhouse gas
emissions resulting in harm caused by Hurricane Katrina).
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Namely, standing and political question non-justiciability have presented
constant impediments to plaintiffs seeking compensation for or
mitigation of damage.221
Advocates have nonetheless carved out some victories. In
Massachusetts v. EPA, not only did the Court recognize the harms caused
by climate change (albeit relatively abstractly), but it also found that
climate change being a global phenomenon did not prohibit a finding of
particularized injury.222 The Court noted that “climate-change risks
[being] ‘widely shared’ does not minimize [the state’s] interest in the
outcome of this litigation.”223 Petitioners seeking Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) regulation of greenhouse gases as air pollutants
under the Clean Air Act won their biggest victory when the Court
determined (1) that they had standing and (2) that their claims did not
present nonjusticiable political questions.224
However, similar successes have been few and far between. Cases
like Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp. demonstrate just how
much further U.S. courts must go before finding that a plaintiff affected
by climate change may have grounds for restitution.225 In Kivalina, the
plaintiff was the Inupiat village of Kivalina, one of the thirty-one Alaska
Native villages deemed most at risk and likely in need of relocation.226
Relying on federal common law public nuisance doctrine, the Alaska
Native village sought redress against twenty-four oil, energy, and utility
companies for their contributions to global emissions that resulted in
climate change and the subsequent melting of sea ice.227 The district court
did not engage in the scientific inquiries required for such a claim,
determining instead that it was a nonjusticiable political question228 and
that the plaintiffs lacked standing.229
American courts have generally not shown a willingness to
221. See, e.g., Juliana v. United States, 947 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 2020) (dismissing
substantive due process, equal protection, Ninth Amendment, and public trust
doctrine claims against the U.S. government for involvement in the harmful
effects of climate change for lack of standing); Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d 863
(dismissing common law nuisance claim against oil, energy, and utility
companies for greenhouse gas emissions that contributed to global warming,
which caused erosion of arctic sea ice, as a nonjusticiable political question and
for lack of standing).
222. EPA, 549 U.S. at 521.
223. Id. at 522.
224. Id. at 516, 526.
225. 663 F. Supp. 2d 863 (N.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d, 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
226. See GAO 2009 UPDATE, supra note 38, at 1 (“In 2003, we examined flooding
problems in 9 villages and identified 4[, including] Kivalina, . . . that were in
imminent danger and were planning to relocate to less vulnerable sites . . . .”).
227. Kivalina, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 868–69.
228. Id. at 873–77.
229. Id. at 877–82.
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undertake even the basic scientific analysis required for arguments
regarding climate change. If tried today, a state court hearing an Alaska
Native inverse condemnation takings claim over permafrost melt would
be unlikely to even address many of the questions presented in this Note,
possibly dismissing on similar grounds to Kivalina.
B. The Potential for a Disjointed Success
Even in the wake of an unexpected victory in a takings claim, the
limited scope of a takings claim undermines the lawsuit’s effectiveness
for addressing the root problem. Alaska’s Takings Clause addresses only
“[p]rivate property.”230 Although rather obvious, this poses an additional
barrier to takings law as an adequate response to the destruction of Alaska
Native villages. While individuals may join to form a class action against
the state, even in victory the awarded money is not optimized for the
effective migration of the town. While people might recover for lost
houses and businesses, there will be no such compensation to rebuild
expensive destroyed municipal projects like schools, roads, and airports.
In effect, even after years of expensive litigation, victory would mean
that Alaska Native villages may still lack sufficient funds to relocate.

VIII. CONCLUSION
An inverse condemnation action against the State of Alaska may not
succeed today, but the legal experiment outlined in this Note provides a
concrete theory upon which takings could be repurposed for
environmental restitution, whether in Alaska or elsewhere.
For example, thousands of miles away from Alaska’s west coast,
hydraulic fracturing, commonly referred to as fracking, has been
connected to the development of sinkholes and earthquakes throughout
the contiguous U.S.231 While individuals have sued the companies for
fracking that caused damages to their homes,232 this Note offers a
230. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 18.
231. See, e.g., Josh Gabbatiss, Oil and Gas Drilling Blamed for Sinkholes
Threatening to Swallow Parts of Texas, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 30, 2018, 2:45 PM),
https://www.independent.co.uk/climate-change/news/fracking-oil-gasdrilling-blamed-sinkholes-threatening-swallow-texas-earthquakesa8281281.html (discussing sinkholes developing in Texas due to fracking); Anna
Kuchment, Even if Injection of Fracking Wastewater Stops, Quakes Won’t, SCI. AM.
(Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/even-if-injection-offracking-wastewater-stops-quakes-wont/ (discussing Oklahoma’s major
earthquakes being the result of fracking).
232. E.g., Arezow Doost, Fracking Blamed in Lawsuit Filed by Families in Johnson
County, CBS DALL.-FORT WORTH (Aug. 16, 2013, 6:03 PM),
https://dfw.cbslocal.com/2013/08/16/fracking-blamed-in-lawsuit-filed-by-
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framework by which they might also seek compensation from states
directly. Similar arguments can also be made about river and oceanwater
inundation and flooding throughout the country.
But for those Alaska Native villages sinking into the ground and
sliding into rivers, something must be done. As legislative support wanes
and executive agencies remain slow to act, the judicial branch offers
another hope. If actions against private companies through other means
are legally untenable, then a takings claim against the state provides a
possible, feasible alternative.

families-in-johnson-county/ (describing lawsuit filed by Texas families against oil
companies, alleging that fracking damaged their homes).

